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ABSTRACT
An active transportation and demand management framework focusing on tradable mobility
credits (TMC) is integrated into an agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) platform. In
this framework, it is conceived that an auction market within which mobility credits can be
transferred between buyers and sellers is constructed in general. The idea of ABMS is
extensively incorporated to mimic system users’ daily route choices as well as market-related
micro-economical decision making process under TMC circumstance. Users are able to form
individual propensities towards available bid/ask choices by reinforcement learning principles.
The integrated platform offers a brand new insight view of microscopic aspect of the daily
operations of credit transfer market, which has hardly been obtained by prior analytical models.
Day-to-day traffic dynamics and market dynamics can be captured. Besides, market MOEs,
including convergence, stability, efficiency and relative market powers of buyers and sellers
under different market policies are investigated. 
Keywords: tradable mobility credits, simulation-based dynamic traffic assignment, agent-based
modelling and simulation, auction, willingness-to-pay, willingness-to-accept, microeconomics.
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the ever-growing travel demand, researchers and practitioners all around the
world have been brainstorming and testing new ideas to reverse the imbalance between
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traffic supply and demand. The Tradable Mobility Credit (TMC) system (1), which
aims to alleviate the traffic congestion, has drawn substantial research attentions
recently. The idea of TMC is simple and can be viewed as an variant of congestion
pricing (2). It is a market-based approach used to manage traffic demand by providing
incentives for achieving traffic reductions and alternations. A Central Authority Agency
(CAA) assigns a certain amount of credits to eligible roadway users. Credits will be
charged when users travel on the roadway network while the credits can also be
transferred between users in market (1, 3, 4).  Travelers do not pay “out of pocket”
unless they exceed the allowance. After exceeding the allowance, the traveler could
choose to buy credits from market or from other commuters. On the other hand,
incentives, in the form of sold credit gain, are given to those who travel less or are
willing to alter their traffic behavior by avoiding peak hour or congested area (5, 6). If
congestion pricing can be viewed as stick, then TMC is more like a stick-carrot
approach. TMC is considered as one of the possible strategies to tackle the inequality
problem that gives rise by congestion pricing. By directly allocating credits to the users
in an even or uneven manner, the problems that leads to public resistance of congestion
pricing because of inequality could be partially mitigated. That is, being part of a proper
TMC schemes, congestion pricing is less likely to make road users feel like being
‘‘exploited” by the government and the potential social and spatial inequity problems
can be possibly alleviated.
The idea of tradable credit is not new, a group of transferable permit approaches have
been implemented in real world applications, especially in environmental control (e.g.,
emissions trading, forestry regulation) (7-14). The major underlining target of all
tradable credit schemes is to eliminate or partially eliminate the negative externalities
of certain social activities in a cost-effective manner. 
In light of trading permit, the tradable traffic mobility credit system gradually
branches from congestion pricing in recent years with a plurality of literatures. In terms
of theoretical development and mathematical analyses, (1) proposed a link-specific
credit charging scheme for homogenous travelers by solving a mathematic
programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Wang, et al. (3) further considered
heterogeneous travelers with differential VOT. The problem was formulated as a
Variational Inequalities (VI) problem. (15) thoroughly explored the effect of transaction
cost impact on auction market and negotiated market. (16) proposed a continuous
dynamic model to describe the travelers’ learning behavior and the evolution of network
flows and credit price. All aforementioned works are analytical models. A
comprehensive comparison between various TMC schemes can be found in (17).
Unfortunately, TMC has not been implemented anywhere in real world to date. To
overcome the difficulties in terms of coordination between different authorities, lack of
road-pricing experience and technique support from analysis instruments, education
and penetration of the new scheme are keys for its successful implementation (5).
Generally speaking, classical analytical models considering equilibrium theory helps
understand important macroscopic characteristics of the TMC system, while analytical
methods may suffer from the potential over-simplification of real-world problem: the
trade-off between different objectives of the market infrastructure designs such as
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allocative efficiency, incentive compatibility, and budget balance cannot be evaluated
in detail in an analytical framework. Further, perfect information penetration and 100%
rational trading action toward system optimal are the most basic assumptions of
analytical MPEC approaches, which actually leave the price formation process as a
black hole that is never been touched (6). Such abstraction in the analytical model
usually steers away from the details of individual agents, game-theoretic models allow
economists to build sophisticated micro-models of individual agents’ reasoning and
preferences. (18):
Aforementioned limitation in existing TMC research motivates our research. The
goal of our research is to investigate the heterogeneous behavioral mechanisms and
interactions among players in a TMC environment in a more realistic manner by
adopting the methodology of Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation (ABMS). ABMS
is a widely adopted concept in modeling the behaviors of individuals in a diverse
population, or the relationships and interactions among individuals. It has been widely
applied to a variety of disciplines including ecological, biology, business, economic
science, computer simulation, social sciences, political science, policy and military
studies (19). The purpose of ABMS are to model human social and organizational
behavior, and individual decision making (20). According to the agent features listed in
Macal and North (21), the individual roadway travelers, as well as the transportation
firms within the tradable credit environment, are all self-contained and autonomous.
They sense information (i.e., tradable credit policy) and translate it into actions (i.e.,
buy/sell, bid/ask action). Their states vary over time, and they are social and have
dynamic interaction with other agents (e.g., credit transferring process). They are the
perfect examples of the “agents” and can be modeled under ABMS framework. As a
result, ABMS stands out to be one of the well-suited options for emulating TMC.
Further insights could be learned from microeconomics. A simulator to mimic
commuter’s market-related behavior would be an essential part of TMC platform. To
this extent we define a Multiunit repeated Double Auction (MDA) institution as the
default credit transfer market that will be deployed in the platform. Double Auction
(DA) is one of the most common exchange institutions which has been extensively used
in stock markets such as the New York Stock Exchange, commodity markets such as
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and in markets for financial instruments, including
options and futures (22), due to its simplicity and yet, remarkably robustness.  In
contrast to normal auction institution, a double auction is a process of buying and
selling goods when potential buyers submit their bids (buy orders) and potential seller
simultaneously submit their asks (sell orders) to an auctioneer. The auctioneer matches
the buyers and sellers with respect to their bid/ask price and the number of unites, and
determine the prices at which trades are executed (23). Parsons, et al. (23) provides an
excellent overview for microeconomics amateurs from a computer scientist
perspective. 
How traders shout bid/ask, or the price is formulated within an auction institution, is
the focal point of interest in this research. A considerable volume of literature is on
trader price formation process in MDA with reservation price given. Among those
studies, Roth and Erev (24) took the law of effect principle, built a model call Roth-
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Erev (RE) algorithm, in which agents construct a probability distribution over the set of
possible offers by reinforcement learning – basically trying the offer and seeing if they
are accepted, which do call for a long trading periods so that agents can be trained.
Nicolaisen, et al. (25) further proposed the Modified Roth-Erev (MRE) individual
reinforcement learning algorithm. High efficiency is generally attained and the market
microstructure is strongly predictive for the relative market power of buyers and sellers,
independently of the values set for the reinforcement learning parameters. MRE was
designed for a wholesale electricity call market in that paper.
Our work aims to incorporate the aforementioned MRE algorithm with an individual
reservation price estimation algorithm to mimic TMC system users’ buy/sell and
bid/ask decision making in TMC circumstance. An ABMS day-to-day route choice
model is also employed as the traffic assignment component, along with an existing
traffic simulator in a simulation platform.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents methodology. Section 3
discusses the numerical experiment results, followed by the concluding section. 
2. METHODOLOGY
Commuters are the basic entities within the modeling framework and are the
fundamental controlled experiment subjects. Under TMC circumstance, commuters
make crucial decisions every day and they all fall into two categories: trading in market
and consuming on roads. 
Figure 1 shows the general flowchart of the whole integrated framework. For each
commuter, he/she needs to deal with market affairs first by going through buy/sell
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Figure 1: Conceptual flow of proposed modeling framework
module (i.e., determine whether to buy or to sell) and bid/ask module (i.e., determine
what price to offer and how much to buy/sell) each day. Market auctioneers (i.e., CAA))
matches bids and asks based on pre-defined MDA policies. Then the commuter makes
a decision in whether to keep on making auto trips or cancel the auto trip within trip
reduction module. If one chooses to make an auto trip, he/she will choose a route in the
route decision module and then goes through traffic simulation module.
2.1 Traffic Simulation and Assignment
DynusT is utilized as the modeling implementation platform for the proposed
approaches (26). The existing DynusT traffic simulator is utilized for vehicle loading,
simulating vehicles’ movements and reporting network performance indices.
An ABMS day-to-day route choice model, which adopts a Bayersian learning
process, is applied to accomplish the task of traffic assignment. Detailed information
regarding this algorithm can be found in (27).
2.2 Policy Making
2.2.1 Credit Endowment
Half a dozen of credit initial endow schemes have been proposed in the literature and
two of which are the mostly referenced; they are 1) uniform endowment, and 2) OD-
specified endowment (1, 3, 28). Comprehensive review on the credit distribution
schemes can be found in (17). For simplicity’s sake, uniform endowment is applied in
this study. 
2.2.2 Credit Charging
Similar to endowment strategies, a number of charging schemes have been proposed
such as link-based, OD-based, VMT-based, etc (1). Detailed review and genealogy of
charging scheme of TMC can be found in (17).
A first-best link-based “Pigovian tax” calculated by real time link marginal cost is
implemented in traffic simulation module. The link-specified real-time variable credit
charging of link k at time t, , is derived by
(1)
Where ttt,k denotes the travel time of link k at time t, Qt,k denotes the outflow of link
k at time t. Cht,k is been updated every t’ minutes.
2.3 Market and Auction
A market within which commuters are allowed to transfer mobility credits is one of the
most attractive places to observe commuter agents’ behavior evolution and to illustrate
how heterogeneous bounded-rational agents’ microscopic behavior rules help replicate
the macro-dynamics of the complex real world scenarios.
A MDA institution is assumed as the default market mechanism. In MDA, a
commuter agent can either be a buyer or a seller. CAA also has the authority to buy
credits at a low price  (can also be referred to as recycle price) and sell credits at a high
Ch Q dtt
dQ*t k t k
t k
t k
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,
,
=
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price  (can also be referred to as reallocation price) as a back-up system in case the ratio
between supply and demand of credits is extremely high or low, aside of the function
to endow initial credits. Figure 2 shows the eligible credit flow directions within the
market.
According to the taxonomy defined in (23), a MDA institution characterized with the
following features will be implemented in this study.
1) Is repeated (i.e., not a one-shot auction), 
2) Is periodic (i.e., fixed transaction time, can be also referred to as call market or
clearinghouse), 
3) With institutional price-setting (i.e., price-setting mechanism defined by
institution but not the further negotiation between buyer and seller) and
institutional trade-determination (i.e., trader whose bid and ask cross must trade
immediately), 
4) With unmatched asks and bids deleted before the next auction round, 
5) Use a discriminatory pricing which is determined by k-double auction mechanism
where the transaction price p = kb + (1 – k)a, a is the ask and b is the bid, b>a.
Whenk k = 1/2, the middle price is selected by auctioneer as the transaction price.
Orders are maintained in an order book in bid and ask priority queues. In a bid
queue, bids are ordered by price; the highest bid is at the front of the queue. Asks are
ordered similarly, but with priority given to the lowest priced ask. Table 1 provides a
detailed look of a sample order book. Suppose this order book with a total of 9
commuters/traders is built at the end of the day, what the CAA needs to do is to first
check whether trader 1’s bid price is higher than trader 9’s ask price. If so, there is a
match between trader 1 and trader 9. The next step is to check whether trader 9’s
quantity can fulfill trader 1’s demand, if so, a trade is executed in which trader 9 sell 35
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Figure 2: Credit flow direction in market
units of mobility credits to trader 1. Similar steps are repeated till either bid order book
or ask order book is cleared. If bid order book clears first, then the market transaction
step terminates, sellers with unfulfilled supplies either still carry those credits without
transaction or sell unwanted credits to credit agency. If ask order book ends first, buyers
do the same thing. 
Table 1: Sample order book
Bid order book Ask order book
ID Oty. Price ID Oty. Price
1 35 1.54 9 55 0.84
4 50 1.45 2 45 0.99
6 35 1.27 5 150 1.10
3 100 1.04 7 110 1.15
8 30 0.93
2.4 Auction Behavior
Three market rules are stated as a prerequisite.
1) Commuters can make auto trips as long as he/she has positive credit balance in
his/her account just before their trips.
2) If a commuter consumes more credits than he/she possesses (e.g., carries a negative
balance after one trip), he/she needs to purchase credits from either credit sellers
or from CAA to erase the negative balance after he/she finishes the trip that leads
to negative balance. Otherwise, a penalty of B/credit will be enforced, which
equals to CAA sell price.
3) If current day is the end of the endowment circle, credits cannot be transferred
through market. Leftover credits are automatically sold to CAA at recycle price S.
2.4.1 Buy/Sell Module
As a commuter agent, two basic sub-problems he/she needs to answer when entering
buy/sell decision module are: 1) whether to buy or sell? And 2) what is the amount of
credits should he/she buy/sell, and at what price? In order to answer the first question,
one needs to conduct a simple individual level supply/demand check. Suppose T
denotes the credit endowment circle, T denotes the amount of days already passed in
current circle, ti′ denotes the amount of days within the already passed t days that
commuter i makes auto trips, ki,t denotes the total amount of credits spent up to today
(tth days in current circle) for commuter i and Ki,t denotes the total amount of credits
he/she ever possessed up to today, including the initial endowed credits and the credits
transferred with others. Three simple rational rules are defined here to handle different
individual supply/demand ratio categories to determine whether the commuter is a
potential buyer or a potential seller on this certain day.
RULE 1: if Ki,t < ki,t, then this commuter agent is marked as a rigid buyer who holds
a negative balance in his/her credit account. For rigid buyers, mobility credits are their
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rigid demand since according to the second market rule, they need to purchase credits
from others so that their negative balance can be erased and auto trips can be made for
the following days. 
RULE 2: if , but Ki,t ≥ ki,t, then traveler agent i is marked as a 
potential flexible buyer. Note that the left hand side part of the above inequality
represents the daily supply for the remaining days in current endowment circle if this
particular commuter wants to continue take personal vehicle for commuting for all the
remaining days, while the right hand side stands for the experienced average credit
consumption per auto trip. For all flexible buyers, they don’t hold negative balance.
However, if he/she wants to take auto trips for all the remaining days, he/she is expected
to purchase some back up credits.
RULE 3: if , then this traveler agent is marked as a potential seller 
since according to his/her previous experience, his/her current credit balance exceeds
the amount that is needed for they to make auto trips for all the remaining days.
2.4.2 Willingness To Pay and Willingness to Accept
After determining the roles (i.e., buyer or seller) of commuter agents in the market, the
next step is to derive the number of units he/she wants to buy/sell, and at what price.
However, we are also eager to know the Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) of buyers and
Willingness-To-Accept (WTA) of sellers with respect to the quantity of wanted unites,
which is actually their private reservation price.
A person’s WTP for something shows the dollar value he/she attached to it (29). It
actually represents the marginal benefit one unit of good can bring in assuming one
already possesses certain amount of goods. In the tradable mobility credits problem, the
TMC circumstance is already well-defined with specific protocols given. Therefore, we
can somehow derive WTP by obtaining marginal benefit curve.
Now let’s define and try to solve a simple problem here: Assuming it’s already just
one day ahead of the end of current endowment circle, a rigid buyer is trying to buy
units of credits, aiming to make a final auto trip as well as to erase the negative balance
in his/her account, what will be the marginal benefit if he/she already buy  units of
credits?
Assume according to this commuter’s previous experience, the daily credit expense
x ~ N(μ, σ2).
If α < ki,t – Ki,t, the total benefit α units of credits can bring is αB because each unit
of credit helps to lower the negative balance penalty by B. And therefore the marginal
benefit is B, which is the reallocation price of CAA.
If α ≥ ki,t – Ki,t, let α′ = α – (ki,t – Ki,t), which is the credits left for making the final
auto trip. The total benefit Ben can be derived as
(2)
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Where A denotes the benefit the final auto trip can bring to commuters, including the
convenience, travel time saving, etc. S denotes the recycle price of CAA, f(x) is the PDF
of x.
The first part of Ben is the benefit (ki,t – Ki,t) amount of units can bring. The second
part represents the benefit α′ credits can introduce in case the credit charge for the final
day is lower than α′. The third part denotes the benefit in case x > α′. Take a derivative
of a for the above equation (2), we have
(3)
Figure 3 shows a sample marginal benefit curve for a rigid buyer one day ahead of
endowment circle, giving that 
.
Similar analysis can be conducted for flexible buyers on the last but one day of the
endowment circle. Equation (3) still holds for flexible buyers.
Now suppose there are still n days left in current endowment circle, the total credit
expense for all the following n days, xn~N(nμ,nσ2). The buyer’s (including both rigid
buyer and flexible buyer) WTP takes the form
(4)
dBen
d
B B S * μ( )= − − ′−⎛⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟α
α
σ
Φ
k credit credit
day
credit
day
20  , μ 10 ,  1 ,i t i t. .− = = =σΚ
B, $2
credit
,  S $0.6
credit
= =
dBen
d
B B S n
n
*( )= − − ′−⎛⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟α
α μ
σ
Φ
International Journal of Transportation Science and Technology · vol. 4 · no. 3 · 2015 217
Figure 3: A sample marginal benefit curve one day ahead of endowment circle for
a rigid buyer
Notes that WTP is also constrained by an individual’s budget, one may also need to
draw a budget curve in the diagram to construct the full perception of individual WTP.
Assuming it’s the last but one day, with $10 TMC budget left, the lower bound of both
marginal benefit curve and budget curve represents the commuter’s real WTP curve.
Unlike WTP, WTA is not bounded by the personal budget. And thus it can be directly
derived by calculating marginal loss of seller.
The loss of a seller if he/she sells α units of credits n days ahead of the circle ends
is
(5)
Where α′′ = (Ki,t – ki,t) – α, x~N(nμ,nσ2)
(6)
Figure 5 shows a sample WTA curve for a seller three days ahead of the ending of
endowment circle, giving that 
.
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Figure 4: WTP curve and budget curve
2.4.3 Price Formation
The surplus of the trader can be calculated according to the difference of individual
reservation price and the final transaction price determined in MDA. Figure 6 presents
an example of a buyer. Suppose the offer price is fixed, this buyer can always move his
offer towards WTP curve horizontally to increase the potential surplus. Suppose point
A and point B are two possible price-quantity paired offers. Point D is the
corresponding transaction of point A while point E is the corresponding transaction of
point B. The area  represents the surplus of this buyer if an offer at point A is submitted
and accepted by sellers. Now as a rational buyer, he will never place an offer at point A
since the surplus can be increased if point B, by selecting which an extra surplus  may
be added, is chosen instead, . Or in other words, point A is dominated by point B. Point
C is not feasible since it exceeds the budget line. To conclude, each point on the real
WTP curve is a dominating point. The proposed clearinghouse auction actually induces
people to reveal their private reservation prices under particular TMC circumstance.
Same analysis can be conducted for sellers to support the same conclusion.
Now the remaining task is to find out the exact location of the bid/ask on
corresponding WTP/WTA curves. The MRE algorithm, which was designed for
wholesale electricity power market by (25), is adopted here. MRE algorithm has its root
from the Roth-Erev algorithm (24), which argues four basic learning principles: 1) law
of effect; 2) power law of practice; 3) experimental effect and 4) recency effect. Three
parameter characterizing MRE algorithm are a scaling parameter , a recency parameter
and an experimental parameter .
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Figure 5: Sample WTA curve
Each trader is given K feasible price offer choices, each with a starting propensity
qik(1) = s(1)X/K, where  is the average surplus buyers and sellers can achieve in any
given auction round. Now suppose at the nth auction round, trader i receives surplus
R(i,k′,n) by submitting feasible price k′. Given a feasible price k, the propensity qik(n
+1) for choosing k in the following auction round (n + 1) is
(7)
where ME(·) is the update function reflecting the experience gained from previous
trading activity.
The update function in MRE algorithm takes the form
(8)
Trader i’s updated choice probability pik(n + 1) towards each feasible price choice
takes the form
(9)
In the final step, the order quantity can be obtained by referring to trader’s individual
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Figure 6: Trader’s offer and WTP curve
WTP/WTA curve with given chosen price offer based on the choice probability pik(n +
1).
3. NUMERICAL TEST
3.1 Tested Hypotheses
Follow the terminology used in (25), the following five indices are the major indicators
of the market outcomes that will be recorded across different auction rounds. 
1) The relative concentration (RCON) is defined to be
Where Nb denotes the number of buyers and Ns denotes the number of sellers.
2) The relative capacity (RCAP) of the credit market is defined as
Where Cs denotes the total amount of credits in ask order book, Sb denotes the total
amount of credits in bid order book.
3) The relative market power of buyers is defined as
Where PBCE denotes the profit that buyers would obtain in competitive equilibrium
and PBA denotes the profit that buyers instead obtain from auction market.
Buyers are able to raise their profit in auction above their competitive profit level
and make MPB positive if buyers are able to exert control over the price of credits in
the auction.
4) The relative market power of sellers is defined as
Where PSCE denotes the profit that sellers would obtain in competitive equilibrium
and PSA denotes the profit that sellers instead obtain from MDA. Similar to the
definition of MPB, MPS should raise if sellers has more control over the price of
credits.
5) The allocative efficiency of the market is defined as
The credit market is tested in form of five hypotheses.
H1: As the initial endowment credit amount increases, RCON increases, i.e., with
more supply, more users become sellers.
H2: As the initial endowment credit amount increases, RCAP increases. i.e., with
more credit supply, more credits will be listed as for sale in ask order book.
RCON N
N
s
b
=
RCAP C
C
s
b
=
MPS PSA PSCE
PSCE
=
−
MPS PSA PSCE
PSCE
=
−
EA PBA PSA
PBCE PSCE
=
+
+
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H3: As the initial endowment credit amount increases, MPB increases while MPS
decreases. That is to say, with more credit supply, buyer can exert control over the price.
H4: Most potential gains to traders are exhausted in auction. i.e., EA is close to 1 at
convergence. Any unrealized profitable trades are those offering the smallest gains (25). 
H5: As we have more and more auction rounds, the average price of credits become
stable.
H6: The implementation of TMC strategies helps to alleviate congestion.
Here the market structure of competitive equilibrium is utilized. A competitive
equilibrium in a market is a unit price P, a total quantity supplied Qs(P) and demand
Qd(P) such tha . That is, the total amount supplied equals the total amount demanded at
price P. Within competitive equilibrium, transaction price is unformed at such a P (25).
Competitive equilibrium is serving as a zero-market-power benchmark against which
the experimental MDA outcomes can be compared. It crucially relies on the assumption
that every trader is price taker whose buying or selling transactions have no significant
effect on the market.
3.2 Numerical Experiment Setups
The integrated TMC platform is examined on an artificial network called Azville, which
consists of 174 nodes and 374 links. All links in the network can be tolled. A total of
more than 15,000 vehicles were loaded into the network. The following Figure 7
presents the snapshot of this network. Mobility credits are assumed to be endowed to
each user every 10 days while the starting time of the endowment circle is different for
each user1. That is to say, day 10 might be the first day in commuter ’s mobility credit
circle while it can also be the fifth day in commuter ’s circle. At the same time, different
endowment amounts within the range between 50 credits per circle to 60 credits per
circle are tested. The CAA recycle price S is fixed at $0.6 and reallocation price B is $2.
Each experiment simulates 500 days, which is equivalent to 50 endowment circle
length. 
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Figure 7: Snapshot of Azville network
1 The policy that all users get initial endowed credits at the same day leads to tremendous market instability
as observed in our preliminary test. Market conversion rate is extremely high at the beginning date and the
ending date of the endowment circle while it keeps low in the middle of the circle. Therefore, this
ununiformed circle starting date configuration is adopted to insure network stability.
As for the parameter setting for MRE algorithm, Erev and Barron (30) suggested a
best fit configuration with s(1) = 9.00, r = 0.10, and e = 0.20. (25) further suggested two
suitable configurations when the emergence for each trader of a dominant price offer
with a relative large choice probability by the final auction round in each run. One of
them is: s(1) = 1.00, r = 0.04, and e = 0.97. Both configurations for MRE will be tested
in this study. The first configuration is referred as best fit MRE and the second one is
referred as dominating MRE. The average profit  is set to $10. Each agent has a total of
10 possible price offers.
A discriminatory midpoint pricing rule2 is adopted by CAA to determine the final
transaction price.
3.3 Results
Table 2 reports the five featured outcome indices of the market in all the six tested
scenarios. The first observation is H1 and H2, which are the most intuitive hypotheses,
receives support from both learning specifications. With the increased supply and a
relatively stable demand, more agents turn to be sellers and more credits are listed in
ask order book, which makes PCON and PCAP increasing.
However, H3 receives no support from both specifications. The changes of both MPS
and MPB are unsystematic with respect to endowed credit amount. Although this result
seems counterintuitive, (25) observed the same pattern in electricity wholesale market.
The demand/supply ratio isn’t well correlated with the actual opportunities open to
individual buyers and sellers to exercise market power under MDA protocols (25).
H4 predicts that a high allocative efficiency can be achieved in proposed MDA
market comparing to competitive equilibrium market. Within all six scenarios, is all
above 0.90 with only one exception. The results indicate good performance of MDA in
terms of allocation efficiency.
Table 2: Market power and efficiency under different scenarios3
Initial endowment 50 credits 55 credits 60 credits
Best fit MRE PCON: 0.61 (0.012) PCON: 0.69 (0.025) PCON: 1.85 (0.066) 
PCAP: 0.35 (0.014) PCAP: 0.56 (0.022) PCAP: 1.45 (0.083)
MPS: -0.406 (0.001) MPS: -0.41 (0.0008) MPS: 0.60 (0.078)
MPB: 0.145 (0.05) MPB: 1.11 (0.08) MPB: -0.33 (0.0056)
EA: 0.80 (0.01) EA: 0.919 (0.007) EA: 0.92 (0.01)
Dominating MRE PCON: 0.588 (0.025) PCON: 0.638 (0.035) PCON: 0.685 (0.022)
PCAP: 0.559 (0.021) PCAP: 0.628 (0.027) PCAP: 0.60 (0.025)
MPS: -0.412 (0.0007) MPS: -0.41 (0.008) MPS: -0.41 (0.009)
MPB: 1.11 (0.08) MPB: 1.25 (0.105) MPB: 1.12 (0.08)
EA: 0.919 (0.0079) EA: 0.933 (0.0098) EA: 0.93 (0.008)
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2To set k equals to 0.5 in k-double auction price determination.
3The values in brackets are the standard deviation of the corresponding outcome index. Sample data comes
from the last 100 auction rounds within the total 500 rounds simulation (i.e., iteration 401~500) where the
market is already stable for all six scenarios.
The convergence of the credit price and the convergence of the traffic flow are
observed in Figure 8, by which H5 is strongly supported. One more point notable is
there is no significant CPU time increase by running the integrated TMC platform
comparing to the pure SBDTA procedure of DynusT (5 sec per one iteration for
integrated TMC platform versus 4.9 sec per iteration for DynusT SBDTA), which
makes it possible to implement integrated platform for larger scaling network with more
agents. Real-world large scale testing is underway to verify this statement.
Some properties of traffic demand management performance of TMC at iteration
500 are presented in Table 3. Here in this TDM performance test, the demand level is
set at 1.5 and therefore there are 22,951 vehicle loaded in the network. The most
attracting observation is the drop of total auto trips from 22,951 to 21,787 when TMC
is implemented and the initial endowment is 60 units of credits and 21,456 when initial
endowment is 50 units of credits, which leads to the tremendous drop of total VMT.
Although average trip distance doesn’t drop with the implementation of TMC (there is
even a noticeable increase in term of average trip distance), drop of total travel time and
mean travel time can be obverse due to TMC schemes, indicating a better traffic
network performance can be delivered by TMC and it strongly support . Under TMC
circumstance, routes that are less congested (fewer credit charging) and probably longer
in terms of distance would be more favored, which leads to the increase of mean trip
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Figure 8: Evolution of credit price and traffic flow relative gap
distance. In other words, TMC helps to spread traffic into uncongested areas.
Table 3: Summary statistics of TMC schemes at iteration 500
Statistics Baseline case Initial Initial Definition
without TMC endowment=60 endowment=50
(dominating MRE) (dominating MRE)
Trip distance (mi) 12.329 12.379 12.449 Mean distance of auto trips
Speed (mph) 26.8 30.9 30.8 Mean auto travel speed
Mean travel time (min) 27.56 24.00 24.24 Mean auto travel time 
Mean STOP time (min) 5.834 2.606 4.371 Mean STOP time due to traffic
lights and congestion
Total auto trips 22,951 21,787 21,456
Total travel time (hr) 10,542 8,715 8,666
Total VMT (103 mi) 282.95 269.69 267.1
4. CONCLUSIONS
A tradable mobility credits (TMC) framework is proposed and modeling platform is
implemented on a simulation-based dynamic traffic assignment platform. The whole
framework incorporates a traffic simulator, an agent-based route choice module, a
double auction market simulator and an agent-based trader price formation module. The
integrated framework is applied to offer a new insight of microscopic aspect of the daily
operations of credit transfer market, which has never been obtained by analytical
models. 
Moreover, the learning principles are implemented in both route choice module and
price formation module so that agents can update personal propensity towards different
choices to reflect the experience gained in previous days. The price offer of individual
agent is also updated over time according to the updated propensities.
The system is examined on a small-scale test network with a total of more than
15,000 agents (vehicles) loaded. We record the market outcome indices such as the
relative market power, allocative efficiency, relative concentration and relative capacity.
Experiment result indicts that the tested hypotheses H3 receives no support, which is in
according with the finding in (25). The higher supply/demand ratio doesn’t necessary
leads to a higher MPB which indicates buyers have more control on the price. However,
the tested hypotheses H1 and H2 is supported by clear evidence that PCON and PCAP
increases as supply/demand ratio increase. The allocative efficiency EA is able to reach
above 0.90 in almost all the six tested scenarios with only one exception, which indicts
excellent profit allocation performance when the designed TMC protocol is
implemented. Finally, the convergence of the average credit price and traffic flows are
observed, which supports hypotheses H5. Finally, a test from traffic demand
management perspective indicated the implementation of TMC helps to alleviate traffic
congestion. 
To name a few future works: 1) a good fit parameter configuration of MRE
algorithm dedicated for TMC system should be explored; 2) the results need to be
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compare with other studies, especially theoretical works in which TMC is formed as
mathematic programming problem.
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